The recent case of the abduction of Bernard Kavuli, in which the victim said that the perpetrators introduced themselves as the people who were “protecting the government”, reveals a dangerous inversion of constitutional roles. In a democratic society governed by the rule of law, it is not the duty of citizens to protect the government but it is the government’s obligation to protect its citizens. The Constitution of Kenya, like many others, is founded on the principle that all sovereign power belongs to the people, and the government is merely a trustee of that power. When individuals justify unlawful acts in the name of defending the state, they not only act outside the law, but also defy the very foundations of constitutional democracy. This paper argues that such rhetoric represents a dangerous inversion of constitutional roles. Far from protecting the government, it is the duty of citizens to question, challenge, and hold the government accountable, to ensure that power is exercised within legal and moral limits. Reclaiming this understanding is critical to safeguarding democracy, justice, and the rule of law in Kenya and beyond.

On 4th November 2020, conflict erupted in Ethiopia’s northern Tigray region between the federal government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), leading to one of Africa’s most devastating humanitarian crises in recent years. In spite of International Humanitarian Law (IHL), civilians bore the brunt of the violence—massacres, sexual violence, and the deliberate use of starvation as a weapon were widely documented. The African Union, despite its mandate to maintain peace and security, struggled to mediate effectively, while international responses remained slow and inconsistent.  It has been five years since the heart-wrenching event; yet its effects still linger. The conflict left thousands dead, millions displaced, and a region deeply scarred by war crimes and human rights violations. While peace agreements have been signed and the fighting has officially ceased, the process of accountability and rebuilding remains laggy. In cognizance of this, this essay explores the challenges of civilian protection in African conflicts through an Afrocentric lens. It also argues for a more context-specific approach to IHL enforcement by proposing innovative reforms that strengthen African regional mechanisms, integrate indigenous conflict resolution practices, and enhance cooperation between local and international actors.

Marriage is a social contract and institution recognized by law and is a manner in which the smallest unit of the society the family starts in most cases. What is allowed at the smallest unit of society is not only a reflection of a society but is also pervasive in such society. Marital rape is a concept that brings about controversial points of views ranging from those who do not recognize it as something wrong to those who wish to see it criminalized. The constitution as the supreme law of Nigeria must take precedence over other sources of law in Nigeria. Marital rape is not only repugnant against natural justice, equity and good conscience but also a violation of the fundamental right to dignity of person. Customary and statutory provisions of law and case law cannot supersede the fundamental human right to dignity of person. This paper will use comparative study of England legal position on marital rape, different legal rationales, jurisprudence, and principles of law for the justification of the criminalization of marital rape.

The duty and business of the courts can be primarily summed up to involve, the administration of justice. The great philosopher, Plato in his wisdom, echoed these words that will form a fulcrum of this discourse, and they are: “The worst form of justice is pretended justice.” In order to circumvent pretended justice and actualize actual justice, we ought to follow the steps of the aphorism of the learned English jurist, Lord Hewart, who stated that: “It is not merely of some importance but is of fundamental importance that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done”, this was held in the famous case of Rex v. Sussex Justices, The above emphasizes the need for the visibility of justice it also adds that, justice is done when the architecture and manifestation of it appeals to the senses of those who behold and come in contact with it.

Since the independence of Nigeria in 1960, the political atmosphere has encountered a mixture of turbulent civil and military unrest, which has shaped the result of her constitutions. The last of them, the 1999 constitution, which is often ascribed as the second democratic constitution, is trailed with controversy following the dubious procedures of its enactment by the military government. The principle of the sovereignty of the people in Nigeria has always been situated but manipulated with respect to the authocthonism of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. It is in the light of this issue that this essay revolves through the defects of the 1999 constitution while suggesting prospective recommendations for a democratic constitution.

The criminal standard of proof in Nigeria “beyond reasonable doubt” is often upheld as a cornerstone of justice, serving to protect the presumption of innocence and prevent wrongful convictions. However, this paper contends that while the standard appears singular and well-established in principle, its application reveals a multiplicity of interpretations in practice. Through an examination of statutory provisions and judicial pronouncements, this paper highlights how different courts adopt varying thresholds for what constitutes “reasonable doubt,” often influenced by the personal reasoning, experiences, and evaluative tendencies of individual judges. It questions whether this foundational standard should remain subject to judicial discretion or whether it is time to establish a more objective framework to guide its application. By analysing relevant Nigerian case law and drawing insights from comparative jurisdictions, the paper advocates for a hybrid approach, one that respects the nuances of judicial interpretation while ensuring greater consistency and predictability in criminal adjudication.